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VoLUmE XLI JANUARY 1967 NUMBER 3
THE SUPREME COURT, THE STATE JUDICIARY
AND STATE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN
EXAMPLE OF UNCREATIrE FEDERALISM
Ismolx SILvM *
W HN the Supreme Court interprets the United States
Constitution, its writ ostensibly becomes "the Law
of the Land." Presumably, all state trial and appellate
courts take immediate cognizance of Supreme Court de-
cisions, understand their rationales, and ipply their prin-
ciples to litigation before them. Perhaps such a char-
acterization will win an essay contest on the nature of the
federal system, but it will, of course, fail to describe the
realities inherent in a scheme of government frought with
tension. Since the Supreme Court is a political body,'
it acts exactly the way any political body does: it attempts
to persuade and to use whatever limited powers it possesses
to effectuate such persuasion. The task of persuasion is
rendered infinitely more complex by the fact that state
courts, too, are political bodies and, as with all political
bodies, have their own "constituencies." Often, the ex-
pectations of their constituencies run counter to, or are
thwarted by, Supreme Court pronouncements, so that we
discover an unavoidable tension resulting from conflicting
pressures from above by the Supreme Court and from below
by local interests. Thus, by the time Supreme Court
doctrines have "percolated down" to lower state courts, they
*B.S. University of Wisconsin; LL.B. New York University; Assistant
Law Professor, University of Massachusetts.
' In recent years, the role of the Court as an agency of government
with shifting relationships with other governmental agencies has been ex-
tensively analyzed. See SHAPIRO, FRaxDom OF Stn-H (1966).
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may be severely distorted. Indeed, the greater the local
interest in administrative freedom from constitutional re-
quirements, the greater the distortion. The most obvious
example of this process is high court decisions in the area
of state criminal procedure.
Law enforcement is local; constitutional rights are
national. The purpose of law enforcement is to apprehend
criminals without regard for the niceties of their theoretical
rights. A local police chief, supported by a local district
attorney, functions as the representative of a society which
demands that crimes get solved, that suspects be proven
guilty, and that "technicalities" not free convicts. The
continued functioning of the law enforcement system de-
pends upon the speed and conclusiveness with which these
expectations are met. The allegedly soaring crime rate'
has created substantial burdens for law enforcement
agencies. These burdens are psychological as well as
physical.
The state judicial machinery is caught in the middle.
It is the natural duty and function of trial judges to ad-
judicate, to apply constitutional and evidentiary rules to
accused defendants, and to determine, in the first instance,
whether the state can carry its burden of proving them
guilty of crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. Yet, common
experience in a criminal courtroom demonstrates that trial
judges often understand their function to be that of up-
holding arrests, searches and confessions obtained by police
officers. Thus, the trial judge often acts as an appellate
review body for police action, and functions as an integral
part of law enforcement machinery. One need only cite, as
an example, the numerous instances of illegally obtained
evidence being admitted into criminal trials on theories
such as "consent," "waiver" and "abandonment." The Su-
preme Court docket is replete with such cases, and the
2 Most of the arguments against liberalization of defendant's rights in
criminal cases are predicated upon the relationship between judicial decisions
and strong law enforcement. See Kamisar, On the Tactics of Police-Pros-
ecution Oriented Critics of the Courts, 49 CoRNi.. L.Q. 436 (1964). Of course,
several interlocking issues are involved here. Is the crime rate "soaring" or
is the very meaning of the term "crime" in doubt, and are we using better
and more comprehensive statistics? See N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1965, p. 1,
col. 5; N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1966, p. 81, col. 1.
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number of reversals in criminal cases bears eloquent tes-
timony to the divergent rules of the high and the lower
courts. To a trial judge, after all, the evidence of guilt
is there, it is undeniable, and no great harm occurs if he
admits it, despite theoretical problems of violation of the
fourth amendment. Convictions in "drop-see" cases-where
the arresting officer testifies that defendant saw him and
dropped the incriminating packet of heroin or policy slips-
are obtained despite the dubious basis in human affairs
for justifying such conduct.' Thus, in these cases, we often
have a system of trial by police officer and acquiescent review
by trial court.
The purpose of this paper is not to discuss compre-
hensively misapplications of Supreme Court rulings in the
area of state criminal procedure (some of which are cor-
rected on certiorari), but to attempt to forecast the probable
consequences of the Court's mandate in Miranda v. Arizona,'
the latest controversial decision causing paroxysms among
law enforcement officials, and to cite some instances of a
failure of "judicial imagination" within the state system.
This cannot be read as comprehensive either in the analytical
or critical sense. Indeed, it is surprising just how often
Supreme Court mandates have been adhered to by state
appellate courts. Yet, the reluctance to carry a given
decision beyond its facts, to apply certain principles to
novel areas, and even, to anticipate the obvious direction
of Supreme Court decisions is disturbing. If that reluctance
exists on the "9higher" levels of the state judicial system,
what can we say of the trial courts? As we shall see,
there, the reluctance often becomes disregard. The
"selection" of cases is not particularly "objective." Rather,
it is designed to provide evidence of a trend which often
becomes a predominant characteristic of our system.
3 It has been the author's personal experience that since Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961), police officers no longer admit that property has been
illegally seized, since, now, such property must be excluded at trial. Rather,
the invariable contention is that defendant "dropped" or "abandoned" the
goods (generally policy slips or narcotics), and that, consequently, warrant-
less arrest was permitted since the dropping of contraband in the presence
of the officer gave probable cause to arrest for the crime of "possession!'
4 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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The Miranda case has received substantial national
publicity and its principles are fully known to knowledgeable
laymen, as well as to attorneys and law enforcement of-
ficials.' Indeed, the case has engendered severe criticisms
from some notable friends of the Court, as well as from
traditional critics.' Often, these criticisms are directed at
the framework of the Court's decision, as well as at the
substance of the holding.' Perhaps an analysis of the
nature of the frustrations encountered by the Court in
previous cases in this controversial area will serve to put
Miranda in perspective. In addition, it may serve to in-
dicate the possible restrictive state court applications of
Miranda in the future. Certainly, it will demonstrate that
the Supreme Court functions not only as the court of
last resort, but often as the only court in which con-
stitutional claims are fully heard.
In order to understand the problem, we must take a
closer look at Miranda. In general, for many defendants,
their "cases" are decided in the crucial period between
arrest and arraignment. If the police have obtained a
"confession," an "admission," or even an "exculpatory"
statement (which often contradicts other evidence in the
case), they have often obtained sufficient evidence to con-
vict. Strangely enough, it is this very period of incar-
ceration and interrogation where no records are kept; it is
here where the great conflict (in the form of a "swearing
contest") between the questioning detectives and the de-
fendant arises.
The Supreme Court first attempted to intervene in the
proceedings occurring in this period by holding, as a matter
of federal criminal practice, that statements made during
a period of illegal detention are inadmissible.8 Although
the Court did not directly intervene in the "squeal room"
process, it set outer limits to the length of the proceeding.
5 N.Y. Times, June 15, 1966, p. 1, col. 6; N.Y. Times, June 20, 1966,
p. 1, col. 2; N.Y. Times, June 25, 1966, p. 1, col. 8.
6 See Packer, Who Can Police the Police?, New York Review of Books,
Sept. 8, 1966, p. 10.
7 Ibid.
8 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
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In 1964, it took another major step. In Escobedo v.
Illinois,' it held:
[W]here, as here, the investigation is no longer a general inquiry
into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular
suspect, the suspect has been taken into police custody, the police
carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting
incriminating statements, the suspect has requested and been denied
an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and the police have not
effectively warned him of his absolute constitutional right to remain
silent, the accused has been denied 'the Assistance of Counsel'
in violation of the Sixth Amendment . . . and . . . no statement
elicited by the police during the interrogation may be used against
him at a criminal trial.
The decision posed great difficulties. Did an accused
have a right to counsel prior to arraignment? After all,
the Court had only decided, one year prior to Escobedo,
that an accused had a right to counsel at trial in all serious
criminal cases."0 If there is a right to counsel at time
of pre-arraignment interrogation, does it exist for a suspect
who has no attorney? The Court stated that the sixth
amendment was violated when "the suspect has requested
and been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer,"
and the facts clearly showed that Escobedo had an attorney
who was trying to see him during the period of inter-
rogation. Other questions remained. What did the Court
mean by "custody"? Did a person "invited down" to
speak to a district attorney have the right to consult his
counsel in the prosecutor's office? Was it permissible for
the police to warn the suspect of his right to remain silent
and then continue to question him, even though he demanded
to see an attorney (his attorney)? The Court did not
mention the necessity of an effective warning that any state-
ment made during interrogation could be used in evidence.
Apparently, all the police had to do was warn against self-
incrimination-without mentioning the practical effect of
such incrimination-and then continue to question.
Clearly, Escobedo at first blush appeared to be a con-
fused and confusing decision. Certain portions of the
9 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964).
10 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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holding could be interpreted to mean that, given all the
circumstances present in Escobedo, the sixth amendment
was violated. Since those circumstances were unusual
(how many suspects in custody have counsel at the police
station demanding access?), it could mean very little.
Unless Escobedo be read as a "unique" opinion, some could
have concluded that the Court meant something more than
to void a particular conviction under peculiar circumstances.
Mr. Justice White, in his dissent, recognized certain
implications.1
[I]t would be naive to think that the new constitutional right an-
nounced will depend upon whether the accused has retained his own
counsel . . . or has. asked to consult with counsel in the course of
the interrogation. . . . At the very least the Court holds that once
the accused becomes a suspect and, presumably, is arrested, any
admission made to the police thereafter is inadmissible in evidence
unless the accused has waived his right to counsel.
The Supreme Court of California, in People v. Dorado,
believed that the "heart" of Escobedo lay in the following
paragraph:
We hold only that where the process shifts from investigatory to
accusatory . . . when its focus is on the accused and its purpose
is to elicit a confession.. . the adversary system begins to operate,
and, under the circumstances here, the accused must be permitted to
consult with his lawyer.12
Thus, the accusatory stage became the critical stage
in the proceedings against a suspect. "After custody the
interrogation may become the critical stage in the establish-
ment of the prosecution's case." " This conclusion was
justified, at least to the California Supreme Court, by
another statement in Escobedo: "
There is necessarily a direct relationship between the importance of
a stage to the police in their quest for a confession and the critical-
ness of that stage to the accused in his need for legal advice.
"I Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 495 (1964).
12 42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 179, 398 P.2d 361, 371 (1965), quoting from Escobedo
v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 492 (1964).13 Id. at 175, 398 P.2d at 367.
14 Ibid., quoting from Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488 (1964).
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Although Escolbedo was couched in sixth amendment
terms, the California court saw a fifth amendment issue as
well. "Escobedo also holds that the accused has the right
not to incriminate himself and to remain silent, and that,
if any self-incriminatory statements are to be admissible,
he must waive that right." "
Rather than concentrate upon the "circumstances" of
the Escobedo facts per se, the court chose to draw the broader
inference that such circumstances were indicative of the
fact that the accusatory stage had been reached. What else,
reasoned the court, could the Supreme Court have meant
when it said: "
When petitioner requested and was denied, an opportunity to
consult with his lawyer, the investigation had ceased to be a general
investigation of an 'unsolved crime.' . . . Petitioner had become the
accused, and the purpose of the interrogation was to 'get him' to
confess his guilt despite his Constitutional right not to do so.
Although the Dorado court could not see the end of the
line, it did look far up the track. "In a long series of
cases the [Supreme] Court has been troubled by confessions
obtained without protection of counsel." "' The court re-
jected the argument that defendant had to demand counsel
(as Escobedo had done) by noting that if the proceeding
was accusatory and if defendant was being questioned during
"a process of interrogation that lent itself to obtaining in-
criminating statements," then he had a sixth amendment
right to counsel which could not be easily waived. Once the
right was established, then any waiver had to be a knowing
and intelligent one and, obviously, this could not occur in
the absence of knowledge of the right. "The basic reasoning
of the Court's opinion in Escobedo will not permit such a
formalistic distinction [between a defendant who has asked
for counsel and one who has not]." I1
Of course, the California court did not fully analyze
the fifth amendment problem and the "back door" revolu-
IS Id. at 178, 398 P.2d at 370.
16 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 485 (1964).
17 Supra note 12, at 173, 398 P.2d at 365.
Is Id. at 175, 398 P.2d at 367.
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tion created in Escobedo. For, assuming that a right to
counsel existed, what could counsel do for the accused?
Since the fifth amendment traditionally only applied to
testimonial compulsion in judicial proceedings, and not to
practical compulsion during custodial interrogation (unless
that compulsion rendered the confession involuntary), could
the attorney legitimately advise his client to remain silent? "
Or, was his duty merely to tell his client that he did not
have to allow himself to be coerced into confessing, but
that short of coercive circumstances, the questioning was
proper? Or, was the Supreme Court merely interested in
giving the accused the moral benefit of an attorney who
could only reinforce him in his determination to remain
silent? Clearly, the portent of Miranda's pronouncement
on the applicability of the fifth amendment lay in Escobedo.
Dorado vaguely recognized such portent.
The Dorado court by refusing to limit its decision to
the facts in Escobedo believed it was aiding the process of
law enforcement.
Law enforcement will be harmed, not helped, by advising police
officers, for example, that it is only when the suspect demands
counsel that Escobedo applies. . . . In such circumstances any
confession that might be obtained would, upon review in the United
States Supreme Court, be subject to exclusion, and convictions
based upon them, reversible. Meanwhile, before the overturning
of such a decision, police officers would continue to follow the
wrong practices. As a result, their work would come to naught.
We have endeavored here to inform law enforcement officers
at what stage of their investigations an accused must be informed
of his Constitutional rights in order that any confession he may
thereafter make to them will be legally admissible 20
Thus, California held that a confession will not be
admitted where: (a) the investigation has already focused
on defendant as a suspect; (b) he is in custody; (c) a
process of interrogation designed to obtain incriminating
statements has commenced; and, (d) he has not been warned
19 See discussion of the history of the fifth amendment in the opinion
of Mr. Justice Harlan in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 504 (1966)
(dissenting opinion).
20 Supra note 12, at 180, 398 P.2d at 372.
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of his rights to remain silent and to counsel. The Supreme
Court "having declared the content of a Constitutional
right, it is our function to enforce it in situations wherever
it logically applies. To do otherwise would, in effect, be to
distort the United States Constitution itself." 21
The California interpretation of Escobedo was not en-
dorsed by other states. 2 Some courts thought that Escobedo
was some form of variation of the traditional "voluntar-
iness" test;" others felt that any potential application of
the decision was rendered unnecessary by other evidence
in the case or by the fact that the interrogation time span
was short; 24 others took hope in the fact that there might
be a different majority on the Supreme Court sometime
in the future.25  Most of the decisions restricted Escobedo
to its facts.
The attitude of one lower court is instructive." The
judge noted (perhaps with a certain degree of weariness):
21 Id. at 181, 398 P.2d at 373. (Emphasis added.)
22 Some of the states limiting Escobedo to its facts are: Alabama-
Boulden v. State, 278 Ala. 437, 179 So. 2d 20 (1965); Duncan v. State, 278
Ala. 145, 176 So. 2d 840 (1965); Illinois-People v. Hartgraves, 3 Ill. 2d
375, 202 N.E.2d 33 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 961 (1965); Iowa-
State v. Fox, 131 N.W.2d 684 (Iowa 1964); State v. Mabbitt, 135 N.W2d
525 (Iowa 1965); Kansas-Powers v. State, 149 Kan. 820, 402 P.2d 328
(1965); Maryland-State v. Giles, 239 Md. 458, 212 A.2d 101 (1965), cert.
denied, 383 U.S. 941 (1966); Massachusetts-Commonwealth v. Tracy,
207 N.E.2d 16 (Mass. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1022 (1966); Michigan-
People v. Hoffman, 1 Mich. App. 557, 137 N.W.2d 304 (1965);
Minnesota-State v. Weber, 137 N.W.2d 527 (Minn. 1965); Missouri-
State v. Howard, 383 S.W.2d 701 (Mo. 1964); Nevada-Beon v. Nevada,
398 P.2d 701 (Nev. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1012 (1966); North
Carolina-State v. Fletcher, 264 N.C. 482, 141 S.E.2d 873 (1965);
State v. Edgerton, 264 N.C. 328, 141 S.E.2d 515 (1965) (by implication);
Texas-Marion v. State, 387 S.W.2d 56 (Tex. 1965); West Virginia-
State ex rel. Duncan v. Boles, 140 S.E.2d 798 (W. Va. 1965); Wisconsin-
Brown v. State, 24 Wis. 2d 491, 131 N.W2d 169 (1964), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 1004 (1965); State v. Burke, 27 Wis. 2d 244, 133 N.W2d 753 (1965).
On the other hand California, Oregon, Pennsylvania (after some hesitancy),
and Rhode Island gave Escobedo an expansive interpretation. See State v.
Neely, 239 Ore. 487, 398 P.2d 482 (1965); Commonwealth v. Negri, 419
Pa. 117, 213 A2d 670 (1965).
23 See People v. Hartgraves, 3 Ill. 2d 375, 202 N.E.2d 33 (1964);
State v. Fox, 131 N.W.2d 684 (Iowa 1964).
24 Commonwealth v. Tracy, 207 N.E.2d 16 (Mass. 1965); Marion v.
State, 387 S.W2d 56 (Tex. 1965).
25 See Duncan v. State, 176 So. 2d 840, 863 (Ala. 1965) (wherein the court
spoke of the "so called right to counsel"); People v. Agar, 44 Misc. 2d
396, 253 N.Y.S.2d 761 (Sup. Ct 1964).
26 People v. Agar, rupra note 25.
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"Objection to the admission of statements taken from a
defendant ... is being repeatedly made by defense counsel
in reliance on Escobedo." 27 After analyzing the meaning
as follows :28
The nub of Escobedo is contained in the foregoing quotations
[those in the case stressing the phrase 'under the circumstances'],
and regardless of what the ultimate determination may be, this
Court holds that Escobedo decided only that . . . 'under the cir-
cumstances here, the accused must be permitted to consult with his
lawyer,' to wit, a case in which he requested a lawyer or in which
a lawyer was actually present and requested to see him.
the Court acknowledged its (negative) judicial role:"
It may well be that . . . [Dorado] . . . will be the ultimate indis-
putable determination of the United States Supreme Court if the
question reaches that Court, as it is now constituted, but until there
has been an appellate ruling to the contrary, which is binding upon
this Court, I will continue to rule that . . . [a request is necessary].
Although some of the Supreme Court's premises in
Escobedo were new, its internal logic should not have been
that difficult to follow. The Court was trying to do what
it has always done in the tender area of state criminal
practice-to establish a general proposition and then to
give states some leeway in changing their own procedures
to bring their practices into line with that proposition. If
Betts v. Brady 3o was the opening shot in the war against
denial of counsel in important criminal cases, then Gideon
v. Wain'wright3 is the end of the war. If Wolf v. Colorado 32
27 1d. at 396, 253 N.Y.S.2d at 762.
28 Id. at 397, 253 N.Y.S.2d at 763.
2 Id. at 398, 253 N.Y.S2d at 763.
30 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
31 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the majority,
stated that "twenty-tvo States, as friends of the Court, argue that Bells
was an 'anachronism when handed down' and that it should be overruled.
We agree." Id. at 345.
Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring, discussed the evolutionary nature of the
right to counsel and the state's role in such development:
This evolution, however, appears not to have been fully recognized
by many state courts, in this instance charged with the front-line
responsibility for the enforcement of constitutional rights. To continue
a rule which is honored by this Court only with lip service is not a
healthy thing and in the long run will do disservice to the federal
system. . . . [Today's decision] does no more than to make explicit
something that has long since been foreshadowed in our decisions.
Id. at 351.
32338 U.S. 25 (1949).
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enunciated the Supreme Court's concern with unconstitu-
tional searches, then Mapp v. Ohio " becomes the logical
conclusion. Of course, the Court had won a significant
degree of public and scholarly support through the years
so that Mapp and Gideon were palatable in a way that
Miranda is not. Why did not the Court follow the processes
of Mapp and Gideon by slowly applying and broadening its
Escobedo principles until, perhaps twenty years from now,
it would reach the Miranda stage and have the support of
an "educated" public and judicial opinion? Perhaps the
Court reasoned that the pace of constitutional change has
speeded up so greatly that a twenty-year wait has no
particular virtue; perhaps it felt that the very obduracy
of the state courts insured that there was not going to be
a great revolutionary ferment from below. Whatever the
reason, the majority of the Court was not content to let
Escobedo lie with all its ambiguities intact.
It is clear, now, in retrospect, that the Court felt that
pre-arraignment statements-at least those elicited by ques-
tioning-clearly came within the protection of the fifth
amendment."' A suspect did not have to speak and in-
criminate himself. Indeed, the Court's repugnance for a
procedure which depended upon the use of defendant's state-
ments to convict him of a crime was manifest.
In Miranda,35 the Court alluded to the controversy en-
gendered by Escobedo. "This case has been the subject of
judicial interpretation and spirited legal debate since it
33 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The Mapp Court was fully aware
of its role in "educating" state tribunals about the fourth amendment. "While
in 1949, prior to the Wolf case, almost two-thirds of the states were opposed
to the use of the exclusionary rule, now, despite . . . [Wolf], more than half
of those since passing upon it, by their own legislative or judicial decision,
have wholly or partly adopted or adhered to the Weeks (exclusion of illegally
obtained evidence] rule." Id. at 651. The Court noted that California had
discovered that other sanctions against flagrant abuse of one's right to privacy
were ineffective and that "the experience of other states" confirms this.
Although appellant had not even raised the possibility of overturning Wolf,
the Court obviously felt prepared to do so-and it did.34 For those portions of Escobedo supporting such an interpretation,
see text accompanying notes 12 and 16 supra.35 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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was decided two years ago." Indeed, the Court viewed
Miranda as, essentially, an amplification of the principle
of Escobedo and, moreover, as a restatement of the law per-
taining to custodial interrogation: "We start here, as we
did in Escobedo, with the premise that our holding is not
an innovation in our jurisprudence, but is an application
of principles long recognized and applied in other set-
tings."36
Of course, this is somewhat fatuous. Miranda has
little to do -with Escobedo; its rationale differs and its
methodology is, to say the least, unusual. While the
Court in Escobedo appeared to limit its holding to the
facts before it, in Miranda it set forth a host of constitu-
tional guidelines in rather meticulous fashion. Why did
the Court resort to such hyperbole? Perhaps, as the Dorado
court recognized, the implications of Escobedo were revolu-
tionary.
If Escobedo had been a hint, it was one which the state
courts resolutely refused to follow. The Escobedo problem
could have been judicially analyzed in one of three ways.
Either future decisions could have gone off on the fact
situation, or, as Mr. Justice White suggested, certain por-
tions of the holding could have been extracted and raised
to constitutional dimension, or state courts could have
"gotten the broader message" behind the specific holding.
Most state (and some federal) courts chose the first option. 7
Thus, the Court's "invitation" to the states to re-examine
their own procedures was not accepted."8
The Court is clearly aware of the tendency of state
courts to minimize the effects of major constitutional de-
36 Id. at 442. (Emphasis added.)
37 The circuits were also split on the interpretation of Escobeda. See
United States ex tel. Stovall v. Denno, 355 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1966) ; Russo v.
New Jersey, 351 F.2d 429 (3d Cir. 1965); Stanfield v. United States, 350
F.2d 518 (10th Cir. 1965); Davidson v. United States, 349 F.2d 530 (10th
Cir. 1965); Hayes v. United States, 347 F.2d 668 (8th Cir. 1965); United
States v. Childress, 347 F.2d 448 (7th Cir. 1965) ; United States v. Gardner,
347 F.2d 405 (7th Cir. 1965); United States v. Fogliani, 343 F.2d 43 (9th
Cir. 1965) ; Clifton v. United States, 341 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1965) ; Jackson
v. United States, 337 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Greenvell v. United States,
336 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1964) ; Cephus v. United States, 324 F.2d 893 (D.C.
Cir. 1963).
8The term "invitation" was expressly used by Mr. Justice Harlan in
dissent in Miranda. See supra note 35, at 504.
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cisions. Miranda contains substantial hints that traditional
evasive doctrines such as "waiver" will not be sufficient
to permit the introduction of statements made in the absence
of counsel. Thus, Miranda must be read as a federal guide
for the use of state court judges in determining whether
true waiver has occurred. The Supreme Court unequivo-
cally stated that there is no such concept of pre-warning
waiver. Thus, police officials must inform a suspect of his
rights to counsel and to remain silent (and of the conse-
quences of making a statement) prior to questioning,
whether or not the suspect knows of such rights. Knowledge
of such rights "can never be more than speculation." "9
Miranda also clearly states that the suspect may re-assert
his privilege against self-incrimination at any time during
the interrogation and continued questioning must stop at
that point. The state has a "heavy burden" to demonstrate
waiver, and the Supreme Court, at least, will be highly
suspicious of any statement made after prolonged interro-
gation. 0 Miranda is replete with statements such as:
"A mere warning given by the interrogator is not alone
sufficient to accomplish [the end of insuring that the in-
dividual has chosen to speak voluntarily]" 4' and "the re-
quirement of warnings and waiver of rights is a fundamental
with respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege and not
simply a preliminary ritual to existing methods of inter-
rogation." 42 The Court characterized one situation of per-
missible waiver:
An express statement that the individual is willing to make a
statement and does not want an attorney followed closely by a state-
ment coidd constitute a waiver.
4 3
Thus, time promises to emerge as a crucial element in
determining the issue of waiver. So does setting.
General on-the-scene questioning . . . or other general question-
ing of citizens in the fact-finding process is not affected by our
holding.44
39 Supra note 35, at 469.
40 Id. at 475.
41 Id. at 469-70.
4 2 Id. at 476.
43 Id. at 475.
44 Id. at 477.
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The Miranda decision leaves open many questions.
Thus, the crucial question of what is custody is left un-
answered, except for a hazy generality." What is an
"effective warning"? If, as the Court stated, the interro-
gative process is inherently compulsive and frightening to a
suspect, how shall we know whether any "waiver" has been
voluntary? Indeed, how shall we know whether there
have been warnings and waivers, when a police officer might
possibly lie or exaggerate?"
If, in the next few years, confessions are allowed
because of sworn (though contested) claims of warnings and
waivers, will the Supreme Court modify Miranda? If one
were to look for hints, he need look no further than the
following:
The presence of counsel in all the cases before us today, would
be the adequate protective device necessary to make the process of
police interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege [against
self-incrimination]. This presence would insure that statements
made in the government-established atmosphere are not the product
of compulsion. 47
451d. at 444. Thus, Miranda applies where "a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way." In State v. Baker, 413 P.2d 965 (Wash. 1966), defendant's car was
identified as having been used in a robbery. A police officer found defendant
at the home of his ex-wife, and asked him if anybody had driven the car
that day. Defendant said "no" and admitted he was the owner; held: (under
Rscobedo) that there was no arrest or custody and that the questions were
"simple, prefatory" ones asked in the course of an unsolved crime investiga-
tion. Where defendant was in custody and a "prime suspect," questioning
designed to give him a "chance to explain" was proper even without the
Escobedo warnings. People v. Luckman, 45 Cal. Rptr. 41 (2d Dist. 1965).
46In dissent, Mr. Justice Harlan noted:
The new rules are not designed to guard against police brutality or
other unmistakably banned forms of coercion. Those who use third-
degree tactics and deny them in court are equally able and destined
to lie as skillfully about warnings and waivers. Supra note 35, at
505.47 1d. at 466. See People v. Hudgins, 46 Cal. Rptr. 199, 205 (2d Dist
1965) where the court upheld the admission of certain statements made by
the defendant while riding in a police car where "there was no course of
interrogation . . . but only a casual conversation between officers and their
prisoner on the way to police headquarters." Federal Judge Shelly Wright
has said:
Unless the Miranda case produces lawyers in the station house, instead
of waivers, the case may turn out to be a pious fraud. .. . The chances
that a court may accept the testimony of the suspect over that of
several policemen as to how the waiver of the confession was obtained
are not very good and 'unless trial judges interpret Miranda in the
spirit in which it was written, there may be very little change in police
practices.' N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1966, p. 81, col. 1.
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Indeed, logically, if defendant has a right to counsel
and to remain silent during trial, and if Miranda, extends
these rights into the station house, and if the presumption
against waiver is substantial, could the Court not demand
proof of waiver similar to that found in trials? If, at
trial, we have a judge and a record, why should we not
have some substantial equivalent at interrogation? ' Clearly
the concept that a suspect needs counsel to inform him
of his rights in the station house before waiver is not
foreign to the Court.
There remains about Miranda, a tantalizing ambiguity.
Much of the decision is cast in terms of compulsion in the
station house, and many will agree that the police-dominated
atmosphere is compulsive. This is a logical extension of
a traditional concept, although Mr. Justice Harlan, speak-
ing for the minority, would argue that some compulsion
is inherent every time someone is questioned by the police,
and the fifth amendment cannot be extended to the psychic
boundaries of understandable fear.
Beyond the practical question of compulsion, there lies
the more fundamental one of the role of the fifth amend-
ment itself. After all, Escobedo reflected a distaste for
convicting a man by use of his own testimony. Should it
make any difference whether he was "compelled" to convict
himself or if some other means were used by which testimony
was elicited from him? If a man were to make admissions
in a thoroughly non-compulsive atmosphere, for instance,
to an unknown police informer or to a police officer "plant"
on a telephone, the Miranda "compulsion" rationale would
be difficult to justify. Future questions may well involve a
choice between rationales and, ultimately, between disparate
concepts of civilized law enforcement.
Certainly, if compulsion is the touchstone of Miranda,
its solutions do not promise to relieve the desperate atmo-
48 Federal courts, at all levels, have not hesitated to demand that
the state provide substantial proof in support of a claim of waiver of right
to counsel at plea of guilty. Doughty v. Maxwell, 376 U.S. 202
(1964); Carnley v. Cochrane, 369 U.S. 506 (1962); Wright v. Dickson,
336 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1965); United States ex rel. Jones v. Fay, 247
F. Supp. 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
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sphere. After all, a police officer may not quite sound
convincing when he informs a suspect of his rights at the
same time that he is trying to elicit a confession. If the
meaning of Miranda lies in judicial abhorrence of confes-
sions per se, then the system of warnings and waivers might,
ultimately, be a way station on the road toward abolition of
confessions entirely.
Some of the ambiguities of Miranda are already be-
coming apparent. In Duffy v. State," a police officer in-
vestigating a stabbing received some information from a
bystander and went to see the defendant. Re was told that
the defendant was staying at his girl friend's house for the
evening, went there, was admitted to the premises by the
girl friend's sister, entered a third floor bedroom, saw de-
fendant asleep, and noticed a knife protruding from the
mattress. He thereupon awoke defendant to ask him
whether the knife was the one used in the stabbing. De-
fendant made certain admissions as a result of such ques-
tioning. He had not been apprised of any rights under
Miranda. The Supreme Court of Maryland held that Miranda
was inapplicable to an accosted defendant not under
arrest.
An accosted suspect need not be advised that he has the right . ..
[to counsel] .... Nor must the state prove . . . that an accosted
suspect was first advised that he has a right to remain silent.
[Miranda] is not applicable to a confession gleaned from a suspect
who is merely accosted by the police .... 50
If state courts refused to recognize the implications of
Escobedo, (partially, it is true, because of the Supreme
Court's obfuscation of the main point) how have they
treated other constitutional arguments where the decision is
clear?
Although there are numerous areas of potentially fruit-
ful study (e.g., search and seizure, half-hearted application
49221 A.2d 653 (Md. 1966).
50Id. at 656. In Westfall v. State, 221 A.2d 646 (Md. 1966), a case
decided after Miranda, defendant made certain admissions after his attorney
had advised him not to say anything. The court held Miranda not to be
retroactive and applied its narrow definition of Escobedo in affirming the
conviction.
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of federal standards of waiver), we need only study one
line of decisions-that of prosecutor's comment on defend-
ant's failure to testify at trial-to understand the approach
taken by state courts to Supreme Court decisions. Indeed,
the choice of this particular area is fruitful since it involves
many of the same considerations present in Escobedo and
Miranda. Thus, courts have been confronted with the mean-
ing of "compulsion" in the context of "self-incrimination"
for a greater period of time in this situation than in Miranda.
If the Supreme Court held, for the ftrst time, that station
house interrogation is "compulsion" per se, many courts
have stated that comment on failure to testify also "com-
pels" the defendant to testify or, if it does not, penalizes
him for the exercise of a constitutional privilege. Cer-
tainly, the meaning of "compulsion" has been broadened by
Miranda to include indirect pressure; the meaning of "com-
pulsion" in the "comment" cases has traditionally been
defined narrowly. Will Miranda force a re-examination?
State court decisions under traditional theories and under
Griffin v. California,"' the case which held that "comment"
violates defendant's rights under the fifth and fourteenth
amendments, will be relevant in determining this question.
The "comment" cases are relevant also because they
involve many of the same considerations present in all
federal conflicts. Balanced against defendant's right to
remain silent, is the state's asserted right to call the jury's
attention to the nature and quantum of the evidence in a
case. Thus, as we shall see, the prosecutor is interested in
what might be called "indirect comment" to reinforce the
strength of his case, especially to emphasize the lack, or
paucity, of evidence favorable to defendant.
The two areas are also relevant, in a practical sense.
Often, the same case involves claims of failure to warn
defendants and improper comment-indeed, most of the
cases referred to in the remainder of this article are "dual"
in this sense. Often a trial court's decision to allow into
evidence an admission and to permit some comment upon
defendant's failure on the stand to explain away such an
51380 U.S. 609 (1965).
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admission results in a conviction. Thus, the constitutional
claims often coincide. Their disposition can only "double"
the available evidence on the issue of state recognition of
federal rights.
Most states have either by constitutional provision or
statute held that it is not permissible for a prosecutor or
trial judge to comment upon, or allude to, the fact that
defendant did not testify at trial. Thus, the defendant,
under state law, has a right not to testify and most states
have traditionally felt that comment would serve to "pe-
nalize" the exercise of that right.2 At one time, there
were six states which permitted a limited form of comment
either by the prosecutor or trial court, on the theory that
such failure is a factor to be logically and properly con-
sidered by the jury in assessing guilt. The Supreme Court's
holding in Griffin terminated that practice. Thus, the fifth
amendment forbids overt comment on defendant's silence.
Such silence, it should be recognized, is often attributable
to reasons other than actual guilt. Indeed, the defendant
may request a specific instruction from the judge that his
silence may not be deemed to be evidence against him and
that it not be considered by the jury at all. 3
The principle may appear to be simple, but it raises
many problems. For instance, let us assume that the state
has put in an overwhelming case and defendant has raised
no defense and has not testified. May the prosecutor tell
the jury that "the evidence in this case is uncontradicted"
or that "you have not heard any evidence from anyone
challenging the testimony of our witnesses"? Would this
constitute a "comment" upon defendant's failure to testify
or merely a general statement relating to the evidence actu-
ally presented in the case? Would the answer be different
if the rebuttal evidence could only have come from defendant
himself?
52 See People v. Leavitt, 301 N.Y. 113, 92 N.E.2d 915 (1950); People v.
Norton, 285 App. Div. 1165, 140 N.Y.S.2d 376 (2d Dep't 1955).
53 In Griffin v. Illinois, 380 'U.S. 609 (1966), the Supreme Court refused
to decide whether a defendant has a constitutional right to demand an instruction
to the jury about his failure to testify. Some states have held that such
an instruction must be given if defendant so wishes. State v. Osborne, 139
N.W.2d 177 (Iowa 1965).
[ VOL. 41
19671 EXAMPLE, UNCREATIVE FEDERALISM 349
Clearly, state courts are interested in enforcing de-
fendant's absolute right to remain silent; they are also
interested in permitting the prosecution to inform the jury
of the weight of the evidence in support of conviction,
especially where it has offered "weak" witnesses and wishes
to buttress the weight of its case.
Other problems arise. Let us say that defendant is
accused of a crime prior to prosecution and says nothing.
May this refusal or failure be introduced into evidence on
the ground that a man accused of crime naturally objects
if he is innocent and that silence is an implied admission?
But, should his silence be used against him where defendant
knew of his constitutional right to remain silent or some
other circumstance compelling silence was present?
In addition, there are many laws which serve the
practical effect of "compelling" a defendant to speak or, at
least, of making any failure to speak costly. For instance,
a judge's reference to statutory inferences that "unexplain-
ed" possession of recently stolen goods or "unexplained"
presence at a place where a certain crime is being com-
mitted may be sufficient to warrant conviction for sub-
stantive crimes and may reinforce the likelihood of de-
fendant's guilt to the average jurY.
The problem of applying Griffin in unusual but logical
contexts can only be analyzed after a determination of the
precise boundaries of the decision. At issue in Griffin was
the California constitutional authorization for comment on
a failure to testify and the following instruction pursuant
to such constitutional provision: "
4 In People v. Modesto, 42 Cal. Rptr. 417, 398 P.2d 753 (1965), the
Supreme Court of California reconsidered the constitutionality of the com-
ment rule in light of Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) and stated:
The California comment rule does not subject the defendant to the
trilemma of self-accusation, perjury, or contempt, for he remains free
not to testify.... [Malloy is only applicable to] more direct penalties
or interferences with the unfettered exercise of the defendant's free
will than the drawing of reasonable inferences that may flow from
silence and comment thereon. . . . The Constitution . . . does not
compel the court to instruct the jurors to ignore inferences their reason
dictates. Id. at 426, 398 P2d at 762-63.
Judge Peters, dissenting, cited Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908)
and Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947) for the clear proposition
that comment violates the fifth amendment although-at that time-the
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As to any evidence or facts . . . which the defendant can reasonably
be expected to deny or explain . . . if he does not testify or if,
though he does testify, he fails to deny or explain such evidence,
. . . [such failure tends to prove the truth of such evidence].
CAL. CoNsT. art. I, § 13.
The Supreme Court noted that the fifth amendment was
binding upon the states through the fourteenth amendment.5
In addition, the Supreme Court of California had held that
the comment rule did not violate the fifth amendment as so
applied. 6 Also, the instruction involved was carefully
drawn. Thus, the jury had to first determine whether the
defendant did have or could have had knowledge about
certain facts before the inference existed. Also, the jury
was told that it could not convict because of such failure
alone and that such failure does not relieve the prosecution
of its burden of proof on any element of the crime
charged.
In Griffin, the Court noted that the spirit of the fifth
amendment involves a policy preventing incrimination
through one's own mouth, and that self-incrimination was
a remnant of the "inquisitorial system of criminal justice." "7
The privilege, the Court held, is diluted by permitting com-
ment since assertion of the privilege is made "costly."
The Court also noted that innocent people often refuse
to take the stand out of fear or other good reason. The
Court rejected the argument that the jury would "know"
or be aware of defendant's failure to testify irrespective
of comment by stating that the prosecution should not help
in bringing forth and emphasizing this knowledge.
fifth amendment was not applicable to the states. Since Malloy decided
that it was, there was no doubt that the comment rule was unconstitutional.
The judge noted that a previous decision had characterized comment as
having a "coercive effect" upon the exercise of the privilege against self-
incrimination and argued that:
We as a state court, on federal constitutional questions, are bound by
the unqualified language of the United States-Supreme Court to the
effect that where, as here, the privilege against testifying could not
have been denied, fair trial precludes 'any comment' thereon or the
invitation to draw 'any' inference therefrom. People v. Modesto, id.
at 429, 398 P.2d at 765.55 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).5 6 See ibid.
57380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965).
58 Ibid.
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The decision is eminently reasonable. After all, the
right to remain silent means little if the prosecutor can
convert it into an implied admission. Indeed, what ap-
parently occurs when comment is countenanced is that
the prosecutor himself testifies in place of defendant and,
moreover, testifies to facts which might not be true.
Clearly, the spirit of Griffin requires that silence not be
used as evidence to supply to the prosecution what defendant
has omitted to state. How have the state courts honored
this "spirit"? Treatments of Griffin arise in several con-
texts, and they will be discussed under separate headings.
Comment on v vidence Cases
In a Mlissouri robbery case, State v. Kennedy, 9 the
prosecutor in summation stated:
'Now, on July 23, 1963, that property was in the home of John
Kennedy. There has been no explanation as to how that property
got there.'
In addition,
'On one side is the State's evidence, not contradicted. And what
is on the defense side? It is empty .... The only evidence produced
was the State's evidence.... The defendant knows about things you
don't know about. It wasn't our fault. He had as full an oppor-
tunity as we did to produce evidence .. ., 60
These comments were upheld on appeal as involving a
mere recitation of the evidence in the case.
In Adams v. State,6 1 a Nevada case, the trial court
instructed the jury (in language almost identical to Griffin)
that a failure to deny or explain facts which defendant
could reasonably be expected to deny or explain indicates
that such facts are probably true and that an inference
harmful to defendant is more probable. The trial judge
cautioned, however, that no such inference may be drawn
where defendant has no knowledge of the facts. He also
59 396 S.W.2d 595 (Mo. 1965).
60 Id. at 599.
61417 P.2d 169 (Nev. 1965).
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stated that defendant's failure to testify will not supply
proof "so as to support by itself" a determination of any
essential element of the prosecution's case. The Supreme
Court of Nevada held that the entire comment was only a
reference to the evidence: "note, however, that we do not
commend this instruction. It flirts with the very dangers
put forth in Griffin 'v. California." 62 To the court, the
flirtation never reached the stage of an active love affair.
In Taylor v. State,63 an intermediate appellate court in
Alabama condemned the prosecutor's statement that:
'[Y]ou haven't heard anyone say here that the State's evidence
wasn't [true] except the attorney who was representing the
defendant'
The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed and held that
a general comment on the uncontradicted evidence was
proper where there is nothing in the record to indicate
that such remark only applied to the defendant himself,
since, given the circumstances, the state's evidence could
have been refuted by a handwriting expert. 4
In a California case, People v. Beghtel,5 the district
attorney commented upon defendant's participation in a
robbery as the driver of a "get-away" car: "[There is]
no explanation by him as to how he happened to meet
[the other] defendant or drive. . . . An opportunity was
given him for explanation; he gave none. . . ." The
trial judge chimed in: "he is the only person who
could overcome the testimony . . . he is the only person
who could penetrate the darkness." 66
The appellate court upheld defendant's conviction and
stated:
A reading of the brief argument made by the prosecution as above
set forth reveals that it consisted almost entirely of a summary of
the direct evidence with emphasis upon its strongly incriminating
621d. at 173.
e6 185 So. 2d 412, 414 (Ala. 1966).
64 185 So. 2d 414, 416 (Ala. 1966). In other jurisdictions, this form of
comment is not permissible even under these circumstances. See note 52 mcpra.
Singleton v. State, 183 So. 2d 245 (Fla. 1966).
65 49 Cal. Rptr. 235 (2d Dist. 1966).
66 Id. at 236.
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effect. The trial court was never specifically urged to draw an
inference of guilt from appellant's failure to testify at the time of
trial.
The court put the problem into perspective."
Similarly, the comment of the trial court indicated nothing more
than its proper conclusion that the evidence introduced by the
prosecution standing alone compelled a determination of guilt . . .
therefore, since appellant had exercised his right to produce nothing
by way of defense so that there was no evidence before the court
tending to overcome the prosecution's case, an adjudication of guilt
should be made.
The court went on to state that even if an adverse inference
were drawn, it was permissible under Griffin.69
In sum, it seems quite clear that the rule enunciated in Griffin
was not intended to require that the trier of the fact, whether
judge or jury, be immunized against any dictate of plain reason.
Of course, Griffin has been extended by many courts to
cover comments similar to those above, and no impartial
analysis can fail to note the existence of such cases.7"
As one court noted: "We take this ![decision in Griffin]
to mean any comment, not just comment comparable to
that on the matter before the Supreme Court at that time." 71
Yet, there are many-too many-cases where the spirit
of Griffin has not been fully understood or applied, especially
where the defendant is designated by name.
Silence as Acquiescence in Charge of Cruilt Rule
Many states permit the introduction of evidence that
defendant was silent when confronted with an accusation
of guilt on the theory that such "demeanor" is probative
of guilt by either acquiescence in the statement or an




69 Id. at 237.
70 Singleton v. State, supra note 64.
71 State v. Miller, 412 P.2d 240, 246 (N.M. 1966). See also State v.
Flores, 412 P.Zd 560 (N.M. 1966).
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In an Iowa case,"' the court held:
Under the law of this State, if a person is accused of the crime
at such a time and under such circumstances that a normal and
reasonable person of similar age and experience and under such
circumstances would deny any guilt, if that person chooses to
remain silent upon being so accused, such silence may be con-
sidered along with all other evidence in determining the guilt
or innocence of the defendant.
Another post-Griffin example of the principle occurred
in a California case, People v. Wilson.3 There, defendant
was charged with burglary in the first degree. He was
out of breath when apprehended near the scene of a
burglary, and did not answer when asked what he was
doing and where he was going. After being told of the
burglary, he said nothing. At trial, defendant testified
that he had denied being the burglar and had given the
inquiring officer his name.
The appellate court allowed the evidence of defendant's
failure to respond and stated that such failure gives rise
to an inference of guilt where it occurred under circum-
stances which call for an explanation. 4
Here, failure to respond was deemed not only an "in-
ference of consciousness of guilt, but also an adoptive ad-
mission that the charge was true." 11 The court noted that
the "natural reaction of an innocent man to an untrue ac-
cusation is to enter a prompt denial," 76 and held that the
trial court determines when an accusation is made under
circumstances calling for a reply, whether defendant under-
stood the statement, and whether his conduct gave rise
to an inference of guilty consciousness. Since the question-
ing had not reached an accusatory stage, and the questions
were not being asked for the purpose of attempting to
elicit a confession, but rather as a "routine means of
commencing an investigation," " no prior warning of con-
72 State v. Myers. 140 N.W.2d 891, 896 (Iowa 1966).
7348 Cal. Rptr. 55 (1st Dist. 1965).
74 Id. at 61.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
7' People v. Wilson, 48 Cal. Rptr. 55, 63 (1st Dist. 1965), quoting from
People v. Cotter, 46 Cal. Rptr. 622, 626, 405 P.2d 862, 866 (1965).
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stitutional rights was necessary. Thus, an answer would be
admissible-and, the court felt, so would a refusal to
answer.
Griffin was distinguished. "Nothing in Griffin re-
quires the rejection of the inference to be drawn from the
accused's nonassertive conduct, or from his silence prior to
the accusatory stage when it is not rested on constitutional
grounds." 11 Other California cases have excluded evidence
of such nonassertive conduct when engendered by the
advice of an attorney. 9 The problem of course arises where
defendant cannot show that his refusal was based on legal
advice.
Even where evidence of defendant's "demeanor" has
been improperly admitted, reversal often occurs on narrow
grounds. In State v. Ripa,s° a New Jersey case, defendant
refused to discuss decedent's disappearance and death while
in custody. The court noted that the doctrine of "assenting
silence" "is much disputed" and "more difficult to defend"
when it occurs during a period of custodial questioning.81
Although the court refused to reject the doctrine where
custodial questioning is concerned, it noted that it would
be a "rare situation" where such silence is to be deemed
acquiescence.2 Reversal occurred apparently because (a)
questioning was custodial, and (b) defendant was not merely
silent but expressly refused to answer.
Statutory Presumptions "Compelling" Defendant to Speakh
Since ariffin, some attacks have been made upon statutes
that permit a jury to find guilt where defendant does not
take the stand to explain his connection with the crime.
These statutes are phrased either in terms such as "unex-
plained presence" (or "unexplained possession" of recently
stolen goods) or "failure to show" good reason for possession.
It would seem that the spirit and rationale of Griffin are
78 People v. Wilson, 48 Cal. Rptr. 55, 64 (1st Dist. 1965).
70 People v. Cockrell, 47 Cal. Rptr. 788, 408 P.2d 116 (1965) (error not
prejudicial per se); People v. Stewart, 45 Cal. Rptr. 712 (2d Dist. 1965).
80 45 NJ. 199, 212 A2d 22 (1965); see also People v. Ridley, 47 Cal.
Rptr. 796, 408 P.2d 124 (1965).
81 People v. Ripa, 45 N.J. 199, 212 A.2d 22, 24 (1965).
S2 Ibid.
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violated by such statutes, for here, defendant's failure to
take the stand is specifically commented upon by the judge
and supplies some evidence contributing to a determination
of guilt. Certainly, in lay terms, it imposes a penalty
upon the exercise of a constitutional right. The courts do
not agree.
The leading case is "significantly enough" a Supreme
Court decision, United ,States v. Gainey."' There, the Court
reversed a finding by the fifth circuit that defendant was
unconstitutionally convicted of the crime of possessing and
carrying on a liquor still without a license because of the
lack of rational connection between the fact shown, presence,
and the fact presumed, carrying on. Mr. Justice Stewart
noted, for the majority, that the inference that one present
at a still is carrying on the business is rational, given the
"arcane"l nature of the crime of illegal still operation. He
also stated that the inference was not conclusive so that
a jury could find reasonable doubt of guilt, even where de-
fendant fails to explain his presence. He dismissed the
fifth amendment argument by noting that an instruction
relating to unexplained presence was merely a comment
on the evidence as a whole and was not related to defend-
ant's failure to testify.
Mr. Justice Douglas dissented in part and argued that
the instruction in this case using the phrase "unless de-
fendant explains such presence"8 4  constituted both a
compulsion to testify and a comment on failure to do
SO.
Mr. Justice Black argued that the statute was un-
constitutional for various reasons and noted that:
The undoubted practical effect of letting guilt rest on unexplained
presence alone is to force a defendant to come forward and testify,
however much he may think doing so may jeopardize his chances
of acquittal, since if he does not he almost certainly destroys those
chances. This is compulsion .... 85
83United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965). The circuit court
held that the relationship between "possession" and "presence!' was irrational
and unconstitutional. See also People v. De Leon, 46 Cal. Rptr. 241 (2d
Dist. 1965).
s4 United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 72 (1965).
Id. at 87.
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He analogized the situation to that where a man is forced
to do something with a gun at his head. He is not "free"
to do so, in a meaningful sense.
The Gainey rationale has been approved and followed
in several jurisdictions."' Thus, in People v. De Leon,
the court instructed the jury that possession of recently
stolen goods was:
so incriminating that to warrant conviction there need only be,
in addition, slight corroboration in the form of conduct of the de-
fendant tending to show his guilt ...
On appeal, the conviction was affirmed and the court
stated:
While the rule requires that defendant either 'show' that his
possession [was honest] . . . or have his failure to do so he
considered a strong circumstance tending to show his guilt, it does
not compel him to take the stand to explain his possession. .. 8
R~ecently, some courts have urged that the statutory in-
ference be applied with care. In People v. Moore,9 de-
fendant had been convicted of burglary. Certain of the
stolen property had been found in a codefendant woman's
apartment, and defendant had said that he gave the property
to the woman after receiving it as a gift from a stranger.
The woman said that the item had been given to her by a
relative. The court had instructed the jury that possession
of recently stolen property, where defendant had a reason-
able opportunity to explain, absent such explanation "tends
to show his guilt." 90
The case was reversed on other grounds, and the
court said that it was better practice to instruct the jury
that the inference should only be drawn where the evi-
dence itself provides no satisfactory explanation.
Despite these relatively rare notes of caution, statutory
inferences with their inevitable effects of "compelling" de-
8 People v. De Leon, supra note 83.
87 46 Cal. Rptr. 241, 244 (2d Dist. 1965).
8s Ibid.89 48 Cal. Rptr. 475 (4th Dist. 1965); see also State v. Smith, 3 Conn.
Cir. 538, 220 A.2d 44 (1965).
90 People v. Moore, 48 Cal. Rptr. 475, 476 (4th Dist. 1965).
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fendants to testify (or penalizing them for failure) are
still permissible, if there is a reasonable relationship be-
tween the fact shown and the fact to be proven.
Courts have also tended to argue that a defendant
taking the stand to testify on some, but not all, aspects of
a case "waives" any claim of invalidity for comment by the
prosecution on his failure to discuss the remainder of the
evidence,9 and that a conviction will not be reversed on the
basis of Griffin unless prejudice is present. 2
A few appellate cases have been chosen to illustrate the
variety of potential applications of Griffin, and the failure
of constitutional imagination among the state courts when
confronted with claims resembling those in Griffin. Ob-
viously, not all courts are heedless of defendant's rights.
For instance, the Supreme Court of Florida rejected the
argument that improper comment on defendant's refusal to
testify need not be prejudicial, in the following terms:
[T]he injury is such that efforts of the trial judge to explain
"I State v. Fioravanti, 46 N.J. 109, 215 A.2d 16 (1965). Here, defendant
at trial tried on certain trousers allegedly used in a burglary to show that
they were not his. This justified comment on his failure to testify with
respect to the remainder of the evidence. "Thus, a defendant who undertakes
to answer part of the evidence against him is subject to comment as to
factual thrusts he does not meet, even though he cannot be ordered on
cross-examination to testify with respect to them." Id. at 113, 215 A2d
at 20. The court cited Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917),
in support, and noted that it has not yet been overruled. See People v.
Masterson, 50 Cal. Rptr. 269 (1st Dist. 1966); State v. Schult, 46 N.J.
254, 216 A.2d 372 (1966).
92 People v. Bostick, 44 Cal. Rptr. 649, 402 P.2d 529 (1965), held that
automatic reversal is only required where there has been an erroneous
admission of a confession (but not of any statement amounting to less than
a confession), or where "fundamentally unfair" trials were involved. See
also People v. Fontaine, 46 Cal. Rptr. 855 (1st Dist. 1965). One court
decided that the Griffin argument should have been raised at trial even
before Griffin because "when Malloy v. Hogan . . . was decided there was
considerable speculation among lawyers and laymen and in newspapers about
the comment rule. Thereafter, any defendant who considered that he had
been prejudiced by comment of the prosecutor on his failure to testify should
have promptly raised that question." City of Toledo v. Reasonover, 213
N.E.2d 179, 181 (Ohio 1965); see also People v. Bauman, 49 Cal. Rptr. 772
(1st Dist. 1966). The "prejudicial error" doctrine has been severely
criticized in Griffin type cases, e.g., State v. Barkin, 140 N.W.2d 886 (Iowa
1966); Singleton v. State, 183 So. 2d 245 (Fla. 1966). The United States
Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari on the issue of whether the
doctrine violates due process of law. Chapman v. California, 45 Cal.
Rptr. 729, 404 P.2d 209 (1965), cert. granted, 383 U.S. 956 (1966).
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it away or to caution the jury against its influence will not eradicate
its adverse effect.9 3
In the words of that court (quoting from another
case) :
Such a prejudice clings to the mind like a tattoo on the epidermis.94
Thus, as prosecutors seek to evade the clear implications
of constitutional decisions,"5 as judges abet their efforts by
classifying such errors as merely comments on evidence or
non-prejudicial,96 and as appellate courts are caught in the
no-man's-land between Supreme Court mandates and lower
court decisions, we can only conclude that true judicial
federalism is lacking in our criminal practice.
Although this study has been limited to those cases
that inch through to the appellate level and, with only a
representative sampling of even those, we only conclude
that much more judicial legerdemain occurs at the lower
criminal court levels. The conflict is, to a certain extent,
natural, for, often, there is substantial evidence of guilt,
and the closer a judge is to the actual processes of justice,
the more substantial is the feeling that this one "error"
should slip by (or that there is no error at all).
At times, the Supreme Court is responsible for at least
some of the tension. Its pronouncements often are not as
clear as they could be and the true interests at stake go
undiscussed and unanalyzed. Yet, state courts should be
93 Burse v. State, 175 So. 2d 586, 587 (Fla. 1965).
94 Id. at 588.
95 The persistent attempts of prosecutors to inject comment was noted
by the Supreme Court of Florida in Singleton v. State, 183 So. 2d 245,
251 n.6 (Fla. 1966):
One would not have to deal in fantasy to assume that the 'varied
circumstances' [in which comment requires reversal] were brought
about by the ingenious efforts of well-meaning but overzealous prose-
cuting attorneys in constantly seeking the loophole, the entering wedge,
the side door, to get over to the jury indirectly what is forbidden
directly.
The court enumerated all of the techniques-and others-already discussed
in the text.
96 "It is with almost melancholy nostalgia that we recall how only five
years ago it was possible to sustain a judgment of conviction entered in
such a clear case of unquestionable guilt and to accomplish it without undue
strain." People v. Boyden, 47 Cal. Rptr. 136, 137 (2d Dist. 1965).
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alert to these interests for they are, in reality, not truly
camouflaged. The Supreme Court, after all, does not accept
a case unless it believes that the situation is important.
The Court obviously is interested in curbing the more ob-
jectionable state police and prosecutorial practices.97 Does
anyone really want to defend a system which depends upon
ignorance of a defendant's fundamental rights to obtain
criminal convictions? If self-incrimination is antithetical
to our concepts of justice, why do courts permit prosecutors
to request suspects to furnish examples of their handwriting
in forgery cases, without requiring that they be advised
of their rights? Indeed, why do not courts recognize that
this form of written self-incrimination is as repugnant as
testimonial compulsion in a Miranda setting? " If our legal
system is one of laws and men, why do we insist that a
policeman's testimony about what went on in a backroom
be automatically believed, especially in light of the practices
discussed in the police manuals quoted so liberally by the
Supreme Court in Miranda? Within the bounds of the
Constitution, should we not all be concerned with what effect
particular instructions have-or are likely to have--on a
jury not versed in the niceties of constitutional doctrine?
In Miranda, the Supreme Court almost begged the states
to discover and apply procedures compatible with con-
stitutional rights. The Court, while demanding that state
standards of criminal law enforcement be raised, is perfectly
willing to let the state handle matters-at least, in the first
instance. If state court judges continue to find waivers
and admit confessions, if they blandly refuse to scrutinize
substantial constitutional claims, is it not evident that
Miranda will be superceded by yet harsher restrictions?
If the tension is to be diminished-though not necessarily
eliminated, for a certain degree of "pull and tug" is
97 See test at notes 30-34 supra.
Is See State v. Fisher, 410 P2d 216 (Ore. 1966). The majority argued
that the handwriting exemplar was "evidence of individual characteristics"
similar to fingerprints and photographs. Id. at 217. A vigorous dissent
stated "that a suspect can be compelled to manufacture the evidence necessary
to prove that his hand wrote a forgery," and'argued that wherever defendant's
cooperation is necessary a potential self-incrimination problem existed. The
dissenting judge distinguished between defendant's cooperation to discover
what already exists and cooperation to manufacture evidence against himself.
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inevitable and even desirable-and if judicial federalism is
to be meaningful, then state courts must assume responsi-
bility for protection of constitutional rights. If the de-
cisions interpreting Escobedo, Griffin, and Miranda are
indicative, the proper exercise of such responsibility is not
readily forthcoming. The Supreme Court has instituted a
revolution in the very way in which we understand the
Constitution. It is a revolution long overdue and it is one
in which the society generally concurs. Unfortunately, its
pace is considerably slowed by a noticeable lack of revolu-
tionaries."
99 "The state courts have an obligation to safeguard the federal rights
of an accused. If the state courts fail in that objective, I foresee further
intrusion by the federal judiciary into the domain of the state courts."
Herbert, J., dissenting in City of Toledo v. Reasonover, 213 N.E.2d 179, 182
(Ohio 1965).
